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Abstract  
 
Since 1910, the major income of Venezuela comes, from the oil exploitation 
industry which is connected to the consolidation of the nation-state. This oil wealth 
has throughout history influenced its relations with countries in the Americas, 
United States and the rest of the world.  
This case-study examines Venezuela as a petro-state and its impacts on Latin 
American post-liberal regionalism and political integration by taking a closer look 
in the history in the Chávez- and Maduro Administration (1999-2014). The study 
also analysis the various regional integration initiatives (OAS, ALBA-TCP, 
CELAC, MERCOSUR, PetroCaribe and the Bank of the South) which exist in 
contemporary Latin America and Caribbean, in which some of them, Venezuela has 
had a greater impact on, and interest in developing because of the paradigm shift in 
the country’s   foreign policy agenda and rejection of the Washington Consensus 
Agenda. Thus, the study has both domestic and regional aspects of the Bolivarian 
Revolution.  
Key concepts and theories are examined and builds up the framework of 
analysis. The study is theory-consuming and theory-developing. The purpose of this 
study is to unfold the following puzzle and research question: Has Venezuela 
impacted regionalism and the integration processes in Latin America in the 21st 
Century? 
 
Key words: Washington Consensus, Regionalism, Integration, Venezuela, Latin 
America. 
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Abbreviations 
AD  Accíon Democrática 
ALBA  Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America  
ALBA-TCP Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
America-Peoples Trade Agreement (Spanish; Alianza 
Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América Tratado de 
Comercio de los Pueblos) 
CAN  Andean Community (Spanish; Comunidad Andina) 
CD  Democratic Coordinator (Spanish; Coordinadora  
Democrática 
CELAC Community of Latin American and Caribbean  
States (Spanish; Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y 
Caribeños) 
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency 
CNE   National Electoral Council of Venezuela (Spanish; Consejo  
National Electoral) 
COPEI  Spanish; Comité de Organización Política Electoral  
Independiente 
CSO  Civil Society Organisation 
EC  European Communities 
EU  European Union 
FEDECAMARAS  Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce and  
Association of Commerce and Production (Spanish;  
Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y  
Producción) 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FTA  Free Trade Area 
FTAA  Free Trade Area of the Americas 
GRULAC Group of Latin America and the Caribbean  
HDI  Human Development Index 
IADB  Inter-American Development Bank  
ICG  International Crisis Group 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IPE  International Political Economy 
IPR  Intellectual Property Rights 
IR  International Relations 
IRDB  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
LDC  Less Developed Economy 
MBR-200 Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200 (Spanish;  
Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario) 
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MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur 
MNC  Multi-National Corporations 
MUD  Democratic Unity (Spanish; Mesa de la Unidad Democrática) 
NIEO  New International Economic Order 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
OAS  Organization of American States 
OPEC  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PDVSA Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. 
PRSP  Poverty Reduction and Structural Package 
PSUV  United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Spanish; Partido  
Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV)  
SUCRE Unified System for regional Compensation (Spanish; Sistema  
Único de Compensation Regional) 
         UNASUR Union of South American Nations (USAN); (Spanish: Unión  
de Naciones Suramericanas UNASUR) 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly 
UN  United Nations  
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
USTR  Office of the United States Trade Representative  
WB  World Bank 
WC  Washington Consensus 
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“As  the  process  of  regional  integration  progresses,  the  key  role  that  President 
Chávez has had in promoting the unity of the peoples of Latin America and the 
Caribbean  will  be  present  in  everyone’s  minds”. 
 
 
UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon in the General Assembly, New York, 13-03-13 
(United Nations News Centre, www.un.org) 
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 Introduction  
1.1 World Politics and Petroleum 
In recent years, the relationship between free-market capitalism and crisis has been 
extensively discussed. The 2008/09 and the world recession in 2009, as well as the 
current Euro crisis, are no exception from this. The primary commodity market is 
an example of these markets studied in which economic turbulence have great 
impacts on (Venezuelanalysis 2014).  
Petroleum has been a fundamental source of energy supply to most countries in 
the world economy due to its positive implications in international relations and 
trade,   economic   growth   and   necessity   in   world’s   energy   production   and  
consumption. One typical association made, regarding the phenomena of the so-
called resource curse of petro-states, would be the case of the international oil crisis 
in  the  1970’s  with  devastating impacts worldwide (Karl 1997).  
There are 131 oil producing countries in the world. Out of these, 13 are OPEC-
members1 (Medea; CIA Worldfact Book). The resource curse of economies 
specialising in one primary good, such as oil, has traditionally been treated as 
special cases within this research area because of the lucrative profits involved from 
specializing in this commodity industry. The oil-producing  countries’  governments  
and their state-owned companies have often had an impact in the development of 
oil-production and the petro-market. An increase in world oil supply is therefore 
dependent  on  these  governments’  support  (Radetzki  2012:152).  
In Latin America, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela2 and Brazil are the only 
competing and largest oil-producing countries, but only Venezuela is both a petro-
state and OPEC-member. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) member states are the following:, 
Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia (withdrew however in 2008, but will re-enter the organization 
if it becomes a net exporter of petroleum again), Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela). OPEC does not include all the major players in the oil 
market which are: Angola, Bahrain, Brunei, the United Kingdom, Mexico, Norway, Oman, the 
United States, Russia and the former Soviet republics. 
2 Hereafter called Venezuela. 
9 
 
1.2 Choice of Case-Study  
There are a number of reasons for conducting this research study - focusing on so-
called petro-states - by describing it from a historical and political perspective, as 
well as considering the national and regional context. In this paper the case-study 
will be on Venezuela. The following four reasons describe the framework from 
which the case-study was chosen upon:  
    1. OPEC and petro-states. Extraction of petroleum in Venezuela started in 1910, 
and is linked with the consolidation of the nation-state.  The  country’s  economic  
dependency in agricultural sector was replaced by the petroleum industry with 
considerable impacts (Hidalgo 2007:3). Later on, in the early 1960s Venezuela 
became one of the seven founding nations in OPEC and the only Latin American 
petro-state. In the OPEC’s  Annual  Statistical  Bulletin  2013,  it was estimated that 
the   country  has  one  of   the  world’s largest oil reserves, and holds the largest oil 
reserves among the OPEC-countries outside the Middle East (BBC 2010; 
Ahramonline, 2011)3.  
     2. An indispensable important natural resource in the Venezuelan economy. The 
oil company - Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) was founded in 1975. The 
privatisation processes in the petro-industry during the 1970s and 1980s, and the 
re-nationalisation in 1976 and 2006-2007, reflects important shifts in the political 
economy agenda in Venezuela (Hidalgo 2007:4). Nonetheless, a particular 
paradigm shift took place in Venezuela by the end of the 20th century, when 
president Chávez was elected as a president in 1999 (Holmqvist 2008:15-17; 
Hidalgo 2007:7).  
     3. Rankings in statistics and international organisations/Non-governmental 
organisations (NGO). Under  Chávez’  mandate,  Venezuela  gained  credibility  in  the  
United Nations and UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) ranking. For 
instance, in 2000, Venezuela had a HDI-index of 0,56, and by 2013 it had improved 
to 0,771, which gives a 71st position among the 188 countries included in the latest 
HDI-report (UNDP, 2013). At the same time, in 2011 Venezuela had never ranked 
so severely before in the internationally recognised NGO; Freedom   House’s 
Democracy Index - where it has generally been categorised as an authoritarian 
regime since 1999 (Freedom House 2013).   
     4. Regional actor in Latin America. Under Chávez leadership, the country has 
engaged deeply in regional cooperation and development in Latin American 
relationship with the European Union (EU). In 2012, Venezuela gained full 
membership in MERCOSUR4, and access to Latin  America’s  free  trade  area  (FTA). 
In 2005, Venezuela also established the regional cooperations of the Bolivarian 
Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) (Sanahuja, 2012:7).  
                                                 
3 The oil reserves are very often compared to Saudi Arabia’s, but if the recoverable oil in the Orinoco 
River could be extracted in the future, then the estimate is approximate the double amount of more 
oil (CSM, 2013). Venezuela has often been referred of being a special case; both among OPEC-
members and also among countries overcoming the general phenomena of commodity curse. 
4 Venezuela gained full membership in MERCOSUR in 31July 2012, after a six year wait caused 
by  Paraguay’s  Congress. 
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The former President Mr. Chávez passed away in March 2013, after battling 
cancer for almost two years and received recognition and condolences from many 
world leaders. 
1.3 Statement of Purpose and Research question   
With the above background in mind and reasons given for choosing Venezuela as 
the case-study in focus; thus, research on Venezuela as a petro-state has not lost its 
momentum. Instead it becomes clearer that the story has not ended with Mr. 
Chávez’  death.  
The focus of this research will be on Venezuela and regionalism. This case-
study investigates how petro-rents transformed the political economy in Venezuela 
from the Chávez-administration and onwards, and how the political agenda 
impacted the regional cooperation and integration in Latin America. As a 
consequence  the  paper’s  purpose  is  to  examine  the  following  research  question: 
 
Has Venezuela impacted regionalism and the integration processes in Latin 
America in the 21st Century?  
1.4 Delimitations 
This case-study covers a time span of 15 years, between the years 1999 and 2014, 
under the governance of the same political party - United Socialist Party of 
Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) - of the Chávez- and 
Maduro administration.  
The concept of regionalism and integration is also central in this article. In 
overall, this social science thesis is concerned with the political dimensions and not 
the economical. This study is mainly focused on Venezuela in the Latin American 
region, and indeed other regions could have been interesting to study, however due 
to space limitations it has not been the purpose to include other regions or countries. 
Equally, it has been necessary to narrow down the history section to mainly deal 
with Venezuela and not the entire history of Latin American regionalism, so-called 
Pan-Americanism and Latin Americanism (Anderson 2014). Instead key facts to 
the different regional organisations are presented in chapter 6. 
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1.5 Research Design 
There is a wide range of theories approaching the issues of regionalism, such as the 
fields of economics and political science, often on competing basis.  
As a researcher, it has been important to strive towards a high level of research 
validity by balancing theory with empirical knowledge and facts. This research 
paper contains a framework in which theory, applied concepts and key definitions 
are examined and operationalised (Lundquist, 1993:99). This research has been 
conducted on entirely objective basis without any external or internal interest to 
bias the results in any manner (ibid).  
The case-study has a qualitative implications based on existing theories and 
definitions. The research design is theory-developing, i.e. observations, facts and 
knowledge are accumulated within the field of international relations research with 
the purpose to broaden up knowledge and understanding. In this research; the 
ambition is to find new aspects about petro-states and regionalism in Latin America 
(Esaiasson et al, 2005:112, 31). This study has an exploratory characteristic in 
which is theory-consuming. According to Esaiasson, this kind of research is based 
on already existing theories and empirical facts to describe a particular social 
scientific phenomenon (Esaiasson 2012:41;).  
This research study is based on the examination of already existing literature, 
mainly secondary source material such as books, academic articles and newspaper 
articles.  
1.6 Disposition  
The purpose of this research paper is to examine a number of theories and concepts 
in order to describe a petro-state’s  impact  on  regionalism  in  Latin  America,  both  in  
general terms and particular in the case of Venezuela under the Chávez- and 
Maduro-administration.  
Chapter 2 discusses International Political Economy (IPE) theory. Chapter 3 
operationalizes regionalism. In chapter 4, the concepts of democracy and petro-
states are operationalized. Chapter 5 and 6 outlines broadly the history of Venezuela 
and discusses some of the regional organisations. Chapter 7 is dedicated to the 
analysis of the case-study Venezuela. Chapter 8 summaries the findings of the 
research paper; followed by references, and appendix, respectively.  
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 International Political Economy   
Many scholars have pointed out that examining nation-states in the international 
system is not a new phenomenon. However, current political arena is becoming 
more complex due to the increased number of stakeholders, interests as well as 
negotiation processes to consider. Negotiation processes can be complex and 
depend on varying factors, such as the impacts from economic globalisation, 
international media, and sub-regionalism (Starkey et al.1999:4).  
For scholars and researchers in international politics, every analytical level 
should be considered as equally important to: “explain  the  nature  of  the  domestic  
structure: why it is as it is, how it came that way, why one structure differs from 
another, how it affects various aspects of life; such as health, housing, income 
distribution, and so on”. To answer such questions, the international system may 
itself become an explanatory variable (Gourevitch 1978:881). The traditional focus 
on IPE has mostly concerned security, war, peace, conflict and cooperation between 
states, but since the end of the World War II - a shift has occurred and now also 
includes concerns on wealth and distribution, poverty and inter-state conflicts 
which gave rise to a new approach within International Relations (IR). International 
Political Economy (IPE) is sensitive to how it is defined, and it depends from which 
theoretical perspective IPE is analysed from (ibid).  
IPE has traditionally paid attention to how individuals, organisations and 
nation-states undertake policy-making under analytical instruments such as Marxist 
or, Economic Liberal. The purpose, in this study is not to choose one perspective 
above the other, but rather explain the differences in this chapter. 
Robert Gilpin is often mentioned as one of the influential researchers within the 
field of IPE theory describing the international economic system, international 
trade, international finance, international monetary systems, hegemonic states, 
North-South relations, multi-national corporations (MNC), and globalisation 
(Gilpin 2007).  
2.1 Economic Liberalism  
Economic liberals consider market mechanism to handle demand and supply of 
human needs and profits in the most rational manner. Individual rights and freedom 
are regarded as essential and encourages minimal state intervention. Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo established the ideas in international economics based on the 
theory of comparative advantage. Liberals advocates free trade as a source of 
wealth, progress and cooperation (Jackson et al, 2002:181). The global economy is 
perceived as an arena for cooperation with individuals, companies and nations, 
13 
 
maximising the benefits and preferences. Classical liberals do not accept state 
interference, but neo-liberals   do,   as   long   as   it   maximises   the   State’s   efficiency  
(ibid).  
Gourevitch explains that liberal theories, in its very essence could be viewed as 
completely apolitical, because economic development is only assumed as possible 
through the existence of a market economy (Gourevitch 1978:891, Frieden 
2006:30-33).  
     While IR in the twentieth century until the early 1960s explained the occurrence 
of war and peace in the world such as the Cold War; IPE instead explained why 
states fail to regulate and stabilise the international financial system (Strange 
1994:11). IPE became interesting in the 1970s due two reasons: the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system and the global oil crisis. The United Nations (UN) called for 
the  establishment  of  the  “New  International  Economic  Order”  (NIEO)  which  dealt  
with imbalance and inequality in both developed and developing countries. The task 
was to establish market economy at the same time as the oil crisis turned to escalate 
and became a highly-ranked international security issue (ibid). 
2.1.1 The Washington Consensus 
The term Washington Consensus (WC), was firstly coined by the economist John 
Williamson and refers to the political agenda of Congress, administration officers 
and technocrats in the Washington-based international institutions etcetera (CID 
2003). It  has  also  been  used  as  a  synonym  with  “neoliberalism”  and  “globalisation”  
for a long time.  
Williamson  says:  “Audiences  the  world  over  seem  to  believe  that  this  signifies  
a set of neoliberal policies that have been imposed on hapless countries by the 
Washington-based international financial institutions and have led them to crisis 
and misery. There are people who cannot utter the term without foaming at the 
mouth”   (Williamson   2002).  Nevertheless,   the   list   covers ten areas of economic 
policies prescribed for LDCs to undertake under the assistance of international 
organisations such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), as necessary measures to recover from economic stagnation and financial 
crisis in the 1980s, mostly undertaken in Latin America (table 1): 
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Many Latin American countries undertook trade, financial and economic 
liberalisation policies and opened up their economies for larger exportation and 
competition and followed the neoliberal policies and advices. Neoliberal agendas 
were actually implemented globally5.  
The WC-agenda met large criticism in the 1980s and continue to do so in present 
time. Critical voices come both from, for instance the WB6 itself, and lately, from 
the new left socialist governments in Latin America, for instance in Cuba, 
Venezuela, and Bolivia7. Failure of implementing the WC is at times referred to the 
case of Argentina which failed to adopt the WC-agenda successfully in 1999-2002. 
After that a new economic agenda8 was brought back to the table; putting the State 
into the centre and promoted to be proactive for economic growth, poverty 
alleviation, socio-economic development in the LDCs of Latin America. Due to 
                                                 
5 For instance in Chile in the 1970s by the military dictator Augusto Pinochet. In the USA by the 
republican president Ronald Reagan who stepped into the White House in the 1980s, as well as in 
the United Kingdom, where Margaret Thatcher was elected as a Primer Minister in 1979. And in 
the post-socialist countries in the Eastern Europe, and in e.g. the social democratic governments in 
the Scandinavian countries; with modified policy agendas being introduced (Brand et al 2009, 
p.5).   
6 See e.g. IRDB/WB (2005).Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform. 
7 Failure of implementing the Washington Consensus is at times referred to the case of Argentina 
which failed to adopt the WC-agenda successfully in 1999-2002. 
8 This  “New  Deal”  is  sometimes  also  called  post-neoliberalism (MacDonald et al 2009, p.22).  
 
Table 1: The Washington Consensus Agenda  
(Source: www.who.int/trade) 
 
x Fiscal discipline - strict criteria for limiting budget deficits 
x Public expenditure priorities - moving them away from subsidies 
and administration towards previously neglected fields with high 
economic returns 
x Tax reform - broadening the tax base and cutting marginal tax rates 
x Financial liberalization - interest rates should ideally be market-
determined 
x Exchange rates - should be managed to induce rapid growth in non-
traditional exports 
x Trade liberalization 
x Increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) - by reducing barriers 
x Privatization - state enterprises should be privatized 
x Deregulation - abolition of regulations that impede the entry of new 
firms or restrict competition (except in the areas of safety, 
environment and finance) 
x Secure intellectual property rights (IPR) - without excessive costs 
and available to the informal sector 
x Reduced role for the state. 
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criticism of the WC-agenda’s   impact   on   the   health   system   a   new  package9 was 
formed with the following ideas and policies (table 2):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Marxism  
Marxist theory is a direct critique to economic liberalism and rejects the idea of 
comparative advantage in trade since the system enables inequality and exploitation 
of labour. Compared to liberals,  Marxist’s  recognise  the  economy  as  closely  related  
to politics – or even prioritise the economy entirely over politics. (Jackson et al, 
2007:309).   In   the  Communist  Manifesto,  Marx  stated   that:  “the  executive  of   the  
modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie”  (Elster 1985:409). The economic system of production is key to all 
other social activities including the political activities which are organised under 
participatory democracy. It is also stated that international capitalism and economic 
globalisation  is  a  continuation  of  the  ruling  class;;  the  bourgeoisie’s  dominance  over  
the working class; for instance in developing countries (ibid).  
     Mayo explains that the 21st century conflicts are among inter-states and often 
about  development  issues  and  continues  stating  that  the  “idea  of  the  state  playing  a  
secondary role in the present intensification of globalization (capitalism has since 
its inception been globalizing) is very much a neoliberal  myth”.  Globalisation is 
about internationalising production (Mayo 2011: 61).  
                                                 
9 Many of the supporters of this new WC-agenda believe that it differs from the original agenda. The 
new consensus moves closer to a neo-liberal, market-friendly approach where sustainable and 
democratic development is central. Poverty-reduction follows the idea of prioritising public 
spending, including education and health. The opponents criticizes the agenda stating that there are 
still remains from the old WC-agenda. 
           
Table 2: “Augmented”   The   Washington   Consensus   Agenda    - 
according to Dani Rodrik (Source: www.cid.harvard.edu) 
x Corporate governance 
x Anti-corruption 
x Flexible labor markets 
x WTO agreements 
x Financial codes and standards 
x “Prudent”  capital-account opening 
x Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 
x Independent central banks/inflation targeting 
x Social safety nets 
x Targeted poverty reduction 
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2.2.1 Hegemonies and Counter-Hegemony 
In the early 1970s, Antoni Gramsci developed the theory of hegemony which is a: 
"consensus-based form of social domination, and complements it with the concept 
of counter-hegemony”  (Brand  et  al  2009:9).  It  refers  to  dominant  groups  in  a  society  
which gain large authority. They possess power and rules on other sub-groups in 
society (including states). A hegemon10 is perceived as a rich and powerful state 
undertaking the task of providing public goods and functions at its best if everyone 
agrees, shares and keeps the system in status quo (ibid).  
Counter-hegemony is a critique to hegemonic power by opposing existing status 
quo and the legitimacy in politics referred as: " an alternative ethical view of society 
that poses a challenge to the dominant bourgeois-led view" (Cohn 2004:131). An 
example, again, of counter-hegemony in politics is the anti-globalisation 
movement.  
2.2.2 The 21st Century Socialism 
 
The Bolivarian Revolution per se is not a Marxist project, but has rather a socialist 
agenda. Chávez, and other leaders such as President Evo Morales (Bolivia) and 
President Rafael Correa (Ecuador) promoted the term to describe socialist 
principles in general. The term is  “a  new  socialism,  inspired  on  the  values  the  world  
accepts as fair in this new century: democracy, respect for human rights - not just 
civil   and   political   rights   but   also   economic,   social   and   cultural   rights”  
(Venezuelanalysis 2007). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 In this case-study U.S. is considered as the main hegemon in relation to Venezuela and Latin 
America. 
17 
 
 Regionalism and Integration  
3.1 Regionalism 
Regionalism is often defined as a geographical fraction in the international system, 
but there is also disagreement among scholars about which criteria to include. 
Mansfield   explained   that   regionalism   is:   “the   disproportionate concentration of 
economic policies among a group of countries in close geographic proximity to one 
another”   (Mansfield, 1997:3). Besides this, Mansfield also refers to Benjamin 
Cohen; adding in other criteria which extend the borders internationally, by stating 
that “countries with a common ideology, culture, history, religion or ethnic 
background, language, currency, also could be considered as regional partners 
(ibid). However, a common identity as a phenomenon varies with time and is often 
subject to history (Strömbom 2003:11). Regionalism is also defined as the political 
processes characterised by a coordinated economic cooperation policy between 
states. Both the administrative institutional processes and the political processes are 
equally important, and often, dependent on the mutual achievements in each process 
(Strömbom 2003:10; Mansfield 1999:590).   
The first actual coherent regional initiative began in the 1950s, after the World 
War II, through the establishment of the EC as a strategic conflict resolution 
project11 to hinder future political conflicts between states (Bernitz et al, 2008:10). 
Thus, the EU is clearly a result of regionalism since it has enabled the endurance of 
economic and political integration up to current date. As will be seen further down, 
Latin America is a typical example where time and history is central in the 
formation of regional organisations. 
3.1.1 Post-Liberal regionalism 
Post-liberal regionalism or post-hegemonic regionalism refers to the move away 
from open regionalism12 in Latin America during the 1990s based on the neoliberal 
trade policies and economic liberalisation. As Chodor et al explains the term; it is 
an attempt to: “reassert  the  autonomy  of  the  region  vis-á-vis the U.S. and the global 
                                                 
11 Ernst Haas was one of the most inspiring architects and pioneers of the EC-project drafting on the 
regional political and economical integration. 
12 Open regionalism is a definition of economic integration based in a regional preference and low 
external tariffs which is aimed to improve global competition through the regional market with 
further innovation and efficient gains. It goes hand in hand with the WC-agenda as of the 1990s. 
(Sanahuja 2012).  In the case of Latin America, the manufacturing market and the SMEs are very 
important. 
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economy, while simultaneously pursuing a more ambitious, state-led 
developmental project with a social dimension” (Chodor et al. 2013). This is often 
referred to as the strategy of endogenous development (ibid:215).  
3.2 Integration 
3.2.1 Political Integration 
 
The concept of integration can be described in many different ways. Weiner has in 
her   article   “Political   Integration   and   Political  Development”   defined integration 
where the aspects cover different issues. Integration can, for instance, be the process 
of bringing together several groups with different social, cultural and ethical similar 
identities and they may have their own language. Secondly, integration may exist 
in  the  problem  of  “linking  a  government  with  the  governed”,  meaning  that  there  is  
a gap between the elite and the mass, which often is characterised by differences in 
aspirations and values. And thirdly, integration can be about finding a minimum 
level of consensus to maintain social order in a society, these values may concern: 
“justice  and  equity,  the  desirability of economic development as a goal, the sharing 
of a common history, heroes, and symbols, and, an agreement as to what constitutes 
desirable and undesirable social  ends”  (Weiner  1965:53-54).  
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 Democracy and Petro-State 
4.1 Representative or Participatory Democracy? 
Democracy and democratisation studies consist of an extensive amount of literature 
and research. The  United  Nations  Vienna  Declaration  affirms  that  people’s  freedom  
of   expression   and   respect   of   opinion   concerns:   “[d]emocracy,   development   and  
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing. Democracy is based on the freely expressed will of the people 
to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their 
full participation in all  aspects  of  their  lives”  (UN  Vienna  Declaration  1993).   
Democracy can generally be explained as a form of governance in a country 
where political and institutional decision-making takes place. Democracy is often 
closely related to moral values and rights, such as the right to freedom. It can also 
include other concepts, for instance: justice and political equality (Giljam et al, 
2003:13). There are two typologies of democracy: representative democracy and 
participatory democracy. Representative democracy emphasis the need of 
competitive  elections  on  regular  terms  in  which  citizen’s  vote  for  political  parties  
and candidates which becomes representative for the entire population, public 
affairs (Esaiasson et al, 2006:15-16). This is a widely accepted model of democracy 
that citizens get one chance on the one day of parliamentary elections to make their 
voices heard about directions in public affairs (Cameron et al. 2012:8).  
Participatory democracy, on the other hand, is a deeper and more enduring form 
of citizen’s  participation  and  learning  process  in  political  decision-making process 
which  impact  people’s  everyday  life  in  a  collective  and  immediate  manner.  In  each  
case; the civil society is essential in the policy-making processes. In participatory 
democracy the use of regular referendums is not a particularly unusual method; to 
consult the population about their opinion in public politics besides the regular 
elections held (Giljam et al, 2003:13).  
The  UNDP  has   named  participatory   democracy   as   “citizen   democracy”   - an 
emerging project where the responsibility of the State over the economy, public 
welfare,   and   the   increase   of   citizen’s   voice   becomes   legitimised   through  
institutionalised direct democracy (UNDP 2006, UNDP/OAS 2010).  
It is also emphasised that these new forms of institutionalised direct democracy 
is unique for countries in the Latin American region. The gap between the citizens 
and the political system is particular for Latin American democracies because of 
the unique historical path most countries have in the region (Cameron et al. 2012:3).  
In this study, the standing point is that Venezuela is a participatory democracy, 
which is another particular feature. 
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4.1.1  Petro-States 
As mentioned above, IPE was utilised in the 1970s to explain the oil crisis. Karl 
(1997)   is   the  author  of   the  book  “The  Paradox  of  Plenty:  Oil  Booms  and  Petro-
States”,  which works as a fundamental guide for analysing rentiers and resource 
curse states, all over the world. Petro-states are a particular kind of states which 
have a main revenue income from the production and export of oil, representing at 
least 40% of total exports and represent a minimum of 10% of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) (Hidalgo 2007:3). These nation-states are highly dependent on the 
production  of  a  specific  natural  resource  that  are:  “expendable,  capital-intensive, 
strategic, vulnerable to external variables and which can provide a high 
monopolistic  income”  (ibid,  p.1).  In  Hidalgo’s  studies  on  petro-states, it has also 
been found that the economic performance is often considered to be poor and 
inefficient (ibid).  
According   to  Friedmann’s  article  “The  First  Law  of  Petropolitics”,   it   is   said  
that: “the more crude prices goes up, the more erosion there will be in individual 
freedoms, the structure of political-electoral jurisdiction and the rule of law in 
Petro-States”  (Hidalgo  2007:3).  These  countries13 are dependent on oil production 
and export, compared to petro-states that are regarded as democracies, i.e. 
representative democracies, such as USA, Norway and UK, since these countries 
were already established democracies before the domestic oil-discovery (ibid: 
Hidalgo; Friedmann 2006:31). 
                                                 
13 The following countries are defined as petro- states: Azerbaijan, Angola, Chad, Egypt, Equatorial 
Guinea, Iran, Kazakstan, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Uzbekistan and Venezuela 
(Friedmann 2006:31). 
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 Empirical Facts I - History of 
Venezuela 
5.1 A Brief Political History  
With Columbus discovery of America, Venezuela was colonised by Spain. 
Venezuela gained its independence in 1811 and from Gran Colombia in 1831 (BBC 
News 2014; Tilly 2007:166). Once Venezuela had gained its independence, Simon 
Bolivar14 continued to lead the freedom struggle from Spain in the neighbouring 
countries: Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru (Holmqvist 2008:15-17; Briceño-Leon 
2005:2). 
Until the early 20th century, Venezuela was subject to military dictators, 
caudillos15, coup d´états and occasional civilian rule. Exploitation of oil started in 
1910, as mentioned in the introduction above, and has to do with the consolidation 
of the state (Hidalgo 2007:3; Tilly 2007:166). A new era started with General Juan 
Vicente Gomez, as the country was opened up in 1918 and invited foreign investors 
and multinational companies such as Exxon and Shell, to extract Venezuelan oil 
unlimited. The oil production gave the government large revenues, and by 1928 
Venezuela  became  one  of  the  main  oil  exporters  in  the  world.  Gomez  also  “blocked  
the formation of any mass popular organisations”   (Ibid:Holmqvist; ibid:Tilly). 
Venezuela was the second largest oil exporter until the end of the World War II, 
and as the US economy grew, it became the largest oil exporter in the world 
(Briceño-Leon 2005:2). In the early 1960s, the political economy was based on 
economic development financed by the oil rents (Holmqvist 2008:15-17).  
A military junta (1947-1958) ended the public and citizens consultations. The 
junta  received  support  “from  the  church,  from  heavily  taxed  foreign  companies,  and 
from   traditional   elites”   (Tilly   2007:167/Rouquié).  Yet   the  military   junta,   led   by  
Colonel Marcos Pérez Jiménez, expanded the reach of oil rents and sold large 
amounts to USA, as an allied. And in concordance with the Cold War situation, 
Venezuela fought communism. However, in 1958, a military coup ended the days 
of the military junta which had significant popular support and soon enough the so-
called golpistas called for democratic elections to be held. Rómulo Betancourt was 
elected as a president (ibid).  
                                                 
14 Bolivar was a Spanish aristocrat, military and political leader and became a key leader in the 
Venezuelan independence war from Spain. Three years later, Bolivar was elected to be president in 
Greater  Colombia.  Bolivar’s  object  was   to  build  a  united  South  America  and  untightening  every  
ethnical and religious group in freedom. Bolivar died in 1830, at the same time as Colombia split up 
(Military Heritage). 
15 Military leaders.  
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Power alternated between the social democratic Accíon Democrática (AD) and 
the Christian Democratic party (COPEI) until 1992. In between Venezuela became 
an active OPEC-member and benefited from the oil crisis in the early 1970s. 
PDVSA was established and soon the oil industry was nationalized in 1976 
(Holmquist:ibid; BBC News 2014).  
At  the  same  time,  Peréz  increased  the  country’s  foreign  debts  which  included  
the ones that IMF pressured Venezuela with. The standard of living for most people 
declined during this period. (Tilly 2007:168). In 1989, Peréz campaigned for public 
projects and price controls, however, as he gained back power; he swiftly switched 
the political economy agenda and instead announced governmental expenditure 
cutbacks according directives from the WC-agenda, and increased the costs in the 
public service due pressure from domestic and international investors16. The 
implementation plans soon met harsh public resistance and demonstrations (ibid). 
In Caracas, more than 350 people died and 2000 were injured. Thus, the incident 
has been named El Caracazo (the Events of Caracas), which eventually gave rise 
to a regime change (ibid; Di John 2005:114-115).   
5.1.1 Chávez Enters the Political Scene 
In connection with the uprisings in Caracas; many “nationalist  army  officers” joined 
a new social and political movement, Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200 
(MBR-200) which was founded in 1982 as the 200-year anniversary of Simon 
Bolívar was celebrated (Tilly 1997:168-169). In 1992, a coup attempt was executed 
but failed and the colonel Hugo Chávez, was sent to prison. While he was in prison 
the group made a second attempt; where they took over a TV station in which 
Chávez declared the  government’s  fall (ibid). In 1993, President Peréz was accused 
for corruption and was removed from his position. Rafael Caldera, who took over 
office, faced a scenario with “collapse  of  the  country’s  banks,  a surge for violent 
crime,  rumors  of  new  military  coups,  and  charges  of  corruption”  (ibid).  Demand  for  
change and order came from the population, and as soon Chávez left prison, he 
entered into politics (ibid). 
 Chávez won the electoral campaigns in 1998 and assumed his role as president 
in 1999. In  an  inaugural  speech  he  stated:  “[w]e  are  being  called  to  save  Venezuela  
from this immense and putrid swamp in which we have been sunk during forty years 
of  demagoguery  and  corruption”  (McCarthy-Jones 2014:48). Later that same year, 
a new referendum was passed to create a National Constituent Assembly (ANC) 
and to construct an electoral law, and to draft a new constitution for Venezuela. In 
December 1999, the new referendum was passed with 70% of the votes in favour 
                                                 
16 The Economic Liberalisation Plan/Package of 1989, according to the WC-agenda  included:  “the  
unification and massive devaluation of the exchange rate, trade liberalization, privatization and 
financial deregulation, including freeing of interest rates, elimination of nearly all restrictions on 
foreign investment and the introduction of tax reforms, including the introduction of value-added 
taxes”  (Di  John  2005:109).  The  Planning  Minister  Miguel  Rodriguez  “envisioned  that  Venezuela,  
in economic terms, would follow the post-1982   Chilean   model   of   neoliberal   reform”   (Di   John  
2005:109-110).  
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of the proposed change (ibid:48-49). Two enabling laws17 (leyes habilitantes) were 
also approved during Chávez first phase of the Fifth Republic. McCarthy-Jones 
states that: “the  effects  of  the  legislation  pushed through during the period of rule 
by decree set in motion a chain of events that would ultimately lead to a coup d´état 
that was primarily orchestrated by the military, various labor and business 
federations,  and  the  opposition  media  outlets  in  Venezuela”18 (ibid:50).  
In April 2002, Chávez was subject to a 72-hours coup d´état which was set up 
by these various opposition groups,   and   “most   of   the   violence   was   filmed   and 
broadcast  across  the  private  television  channels  in  Venezuela  and  around  the  world”  
(ibid 51-52). For just a number of hours - a Carmona presidency was formed, which 
was immediately condemned by the Rio Group19, but legitimised by the United 
States (ibid:51). A countercoup was established and Chávez retook office and 
constitutional democracy. For Chávez, the experience enlightened him of the 
necessity of greater autonomy for Venezuela as well as for the entire region 
(ibid:52). 
The desire to remove Chávez from office remained; the following months a 
coalition called Democratic Coordinator (Coordinadora Democratica, CD) with 
various ideological standing points was formed. CD begun to campaign for a 
domestic   recall   referendum   on   Chávez’   presidency20. An oil strike was also 
coordinated in December 2002 and lasted until February 2003. This destabilised the 
situation in Venezuela due reduced oil exports and impacts on the economy. Many 
PDVSA officials were sacked and new ones that sympathised with the government 
were recruited. On June 3, 2004, the National Electoral Council (CNE) announced 
that a sufficient number of signatures had been gathered in order to allow for a recall 
referendum. The final results showed that only 40,6393% had voted ”No”  to  the  
referendum (ibid:53). The referendum-challenge showed Chávez that the 
administration had gained legitimacy and thus consolidated power which enabled 
him to plunge into foreign policy – both in international and regional matters (ibid).  
 
                                                 
17 It’s  essential  to  stress  that  the  enabling laws is not a new phenomena connected to Chávez, but 
actually they existed already in 1961 and were used during the Fourth Republic by President Pérez 
(McCarthy-Jones 2014:48). The first one, enabled Chávez during a period of six months to legislate 
in economy and finance matters in Venezuela. During the sixth months, 26 new laws were passed. 
The  second,  concerned  the  approval  of  extended  temporary  power  of  “rule  by  decree”  during  one  
year to facilitate quicker the policy reforms in the midst of financial downturn. However, it was not 
until the end of 2001 that Chavez run through 49 different laws with the aim of fortifying the 
Bolivarian Revolution (21st century socialism) (ibid). However, Chávez was met with large concern 
and outrage when it came to enabling power on certain areas such as the property rights of petroleum, 
agricultural and the educational sector. Because of this business and labour groups, CSOs, political 
parties and the middle class complained extensively (McCarthy-Jones 2014:49). 
18 The alliance was contained by Carlos Ortega (leader of the Venezuelan Workers Conderation 
(Confederacíon de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV), influential national trade unions, Pedro 
Carmona who was the head of the Venezuelan FEDECAMARAS. 
19 The Rio Group is an international organization of Latin American and some Caribbean countries. 
The organisation was established in 1986 in Rio de Janeiro and included Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Occasionally during the Cold War, it 
was regarded as an alternative OAS. 
20 As prescribed in article 72 of the 1999 Constitution of Venezuela states. See Appendix 1-  
Venezuela’s  Constitution  1999. 
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Chávez won the presidential elections of 2006 (63% support votes) and 2012 
(54% support votes), and beated the opposition candidate, Manuel Rosales, and 
Henrique Capriles, respectively. The elections were declared as free and legitimate 
by OAS and the Carter Center (The Carter Center; ABC News 2012).  
The former President Mr. Chávez passed away in March 2013, after battling 
cancer for almost two years and received recognition and condolences from many 
world leaders. No leader of any international organisations or Head of State and 
governments in world politics was left untouched. Even Mr. Vuk Jeremic, the 
former  President  of  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly’s  (UNGA),  noted  that:  
“[h]istory   will   remember   President   Chávez   – a charismatic leader whose 
progressive  policies  brought  Venezuela’s  poverty  rate  down  from  over  70  per  cent 
at   the  close  of   the  20th  century  to  around  20  per  cent   today”  (UN  News  Centre,  
2013).  
5.1.2 The Post-Chávez Era and New Presidential Elections in 2013 
 
The death of Chávez left the government weak and the charismatic leadership was 
missed (Lander 2014:7).  Uncertainty about the future of Venezuela was a fact and 
there were doubts about the continuation of some of the key initiatives that existed 
with countries around the world. Chávez had played an important role in the current 
key initiatives of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC (see also chapter 6-8). Despite 
this, status quo was expected to remain in Venezuela as the country was expected 
to continue being ruled by PSUV (EIU 2013)21.  
In April 2013, special elections were held in Venezuela as a consequence of 
Chávez’  death.  In February 2014, widely national unrest gave rise to instabilities in 
Venezuela after that students had called for demonstration against the economic 
situation and deaths had taken place. By May 2014, around 40 deaths had been 
estimated  which  worsened  Venezuela’s  human  rights  records  (ICG2:2014).  
According to the Maduro’s administration, the origin of the situation came from 
a conspiracy that the opposition Democratic Unity (Mesa de la Unidad 
Democrática, MUD), led by Henrique Capriles had orchestrated it, in accordance 
with the United States to overthrow the government and restore the pre-Chávez 
regime order (ibid).  
MUD, instead, claimed that the main reasons rather concerned the  government’s  
socialist policies, the lack of respect for the constitution, the economic instability 
and increased crime and violence on the streets (ibid). The problematic with the 
situation was that it could have led to region-wide consequences to still pending 
issues, such as the continued mediation in the FARC-guerrilla war in Colombia, 
and the economic reforms in Cuba, in which Venezuela has diplomatic and political 
“ties”  with  (ibid).   
Maduro won the elections with only 1,5% in its margins and “the electoral field 
was anything but level. The government broadcasting organisation, which includes 
                                                 
21EUI expected differences in the short and long terms impacts on regional cooperation; where the 
latter consisted in reduced role as a “regional  power”,  in  much  favour  for  Brazil  (ibid). 
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six state television outlets and an extensive network of radio stations, as well as 
official print media, gave blanket coverage to Maduro, while ignoring or 
denigrating  Capriles”  (ICG1:4).  MUD  did  however  not   trust   the  results  from  the  
ballots.  
On 18 April, Maduro met in Lima with presidents from UNASUR who were 
increasingly worried by the appearance of growing instability (ibid).  
In September in 2014, Venezuela was chosen to be one of two representatives 
in the Group of Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC), as a non-permanent 
member in the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), even though it was a domestically 
troubled country (Foreign Policy 2014).  
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 Empirical Facts II - Regional 
Integration Initiatives in Latin America 
6.1 The Bolivarian Revolution and Foreign Policy 
During the second phase (2005-present) of the Bolivarian Revolution a shift 
occurred, from domestic to foreign policy issues, both at an international as regional 
level,   and  “sought   to   redefine  both  Venezuela’s  and  Latin  America’s   role   in   the  
international system” (McCarthy-Jones 2014:53).  
 
6.1.1 ALBA-TCP 
Venezuela began to focus its promotion and strengths in regional integration and 
solidarity through increasing the process of institutionalisation as a way to break 
the historical bilateral relations with the United States. The work on ALBA was 
particular an important   step   towards   this   “new   strategic   map”   which   showed   a  
“radicalisation  of  Venezuelan  foreign  policy”  (McCarthy-Jones 2014:54). ALBA22 
as a trade and development bloc formed the first part of foreign policy in 
Venezuela’s  agenda (ibid). 
ALBA   Peoples’ Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP23) was proposed by President 
Chávez in 2001, but was signed firstly by 2004 in Havana, Cuba. It started with the 
signing of the first agreement in 2004 which consisted in the exchange of 20000 
Cuban doctors for subsidised Venezuelan petroleum (ibid). Chávez played an 
important role in reshaping Latin America by this act. When he was in Argentina 
to meet President Nestor Kirchner in 2005; it was announced that the FTAA, lead 
by Washington was dead and would be buried in the summit at Mar del Plata. 
Chávez was right in that suggestion (Anderson 2014:13; Arenas-Garcia 2013:71).  
ALBA includes promotion of trade between countries, but also tariff barriers 
reduction on certain products even though its main purpose goes far beyond this. 
The explicit  aim  of  ALBA  is   to  promote  “regional  and  south-south cooperation, 
along with social and industrial development, as a counter-project to U.S dominated 
free   trade   agreements,  which  had  mostly   ensured   access   for   giant   corporations”  
(Anderson 2014:27), with this the social side of development is also promoted - so 
                                                 
22 ALBA’s  member  countries  are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Venezuela, Saint Lucia. 
23 The  title  of  ALBA  was  extended  to  ALBA  “Peoples  Trade  Agreement”,  ALBA-TCP (ALBA 
tratado de libre comercio) as a contrast to FTAA. 
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called endogenous development (Chodor 2013:215; McCarthy-Jones 2014; 
Briceno-Ruiz 2014:2-3).  
Today, ALBA has  developed  into  a  “competitive  power  bloc  in  the  region  that  
rejects neoliberal approaches  to  development”,   i.e.  refuses,  for  instance  the  WC-
agenda and IMFs structural adjustments reforms (ibid:54-55).  
One of the main common projects is the establishment of the common regional 
currency24 between member states. The idea was proposed by Ecuador in 2008. In 
2009, the presidents and heads of state met to discuss the issue which resulted in an 
agreement signed about the SUCRE25. The most powerful activities in ALBA 
during the first years were the social programs which included literacy, primary 
health care, education and health programs. These programs were supported by 
Venezuela which contributed with the logistical aspects of the projects, while 
Cuban professionals staffed the programmes (Anderson 2014:29). Adult literacy 
rates reduced in Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua in just a few years. The idea was 
to stimulate international participation in social development programs from a 
bottom-up and top-down perspective at the same time. By 2011, 11 million people 
was lifted out of poverty, 3,5 million people became more literate, infant mortality 
reduced by 32%, and assistance was given to almost 1 million of handicapped 
people (ibid:30). 
6.2 Other Regional Organisations 
6.2.1 Organization of the American States - OAS  
The First International Conference of American States was held in Washington 
D.C. in October 1889 to April 189026 (OAS 2014). The OAS was created in 1948 
at a conference in Bogota (Anderson 2014:21). The Charter of the OAS entered into 
force in 1951. In the beginning OAS was hardly accepted in Latin America due to 
the economic power the US had in the post-war years and due to how weak the 
Latin American region was. The dream of a strong region persisted. However, with 
the victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the OAS was mostly used to hit on 
Cuba  and  the  fight  against  communism.  The  OAS  “condemned  the  Marxist-Leninst 
nature Americas quart of   Cuba’s   new   system   as   incompatible   with   the   inter-
American  system”  (Anderson  2014:22). 
                                                 
24The idea was proposed by Ecuador in 2008. In 2009 the presidents and heads of state met to discuss 
the issue which resulted in an agreement signed about the SUCRE (SUCRE: Unified System for 
regional Compensation).  
25 The idea of SUCRE was proposed by Ecuador in 2008. In 2009 the presidents and heads of state 
met to discuss the issue which resulted in an agreement signed. It is a virtual regional currency for 
the specific purpose of commercial and financial activities between the ALBA countries. The 
ALBA-project also include a bank and Telesur (a multinational television station) and a 
transnational companies network (ibid).  
26 The meeting established the International Union of American Republics and the stage was set to 
establish the so-called inter-American system, which is the oldest known international institutional 
system (www.oas.org). 
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Today, OAS brings together a total of 35 states and constitutes the   “main  
political, juridical, and social governmental forum in the Hemisphere” (OAS 2014). 
The OAS has also granted permanent observer status to 69 states, including to 
the EU, and the main purposes are based on four main pillars which concerns 
development, democracy, human rights and security (ibid). 
As mentioned above, ALBA and its Bolivarian Alliance via the 21st century 
socialism was used to express the foreign policy agenda of Chávez. It reflected an 
alternative to the so-called Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) which was a 
free trade zone - covering Canada to Argentina - initially developed by the U.S. 
President Bill Clinton in 1994 in Miami (Americas Quarterly). The FTAA-proposal 
came up during the third Summit of the Americas which are summit initiatives 
made by the OAS, and then one sixth of the member states rejected the proposal27 
(McCarthy-Jones 2014:54). 
6.2.2 The Union of South American Nations – UNASUR 
 
UNASUR was established in 2008 in order to deal with salient issues in energy, 
education, health, environment, infrastructure, security and democracy. The aim 
was to deepen the bonds between the South American countries and regional 
objectives with its social assets and energy resources (UNASUR 2014).  
There are twelve member states28, and these want to build a regional identity 
based on a shared history and multilateral principles, rule of law in international 
relations and respect for human rights and democratic processes (ibid). UNASUR 
was finally created after the South American Community of Nations (CSN) during 
the third meeting of the presidents of South America in December 2004 in Cuzco, 
Peru (McCarthy-Jones 2014:58). It united two regional forces: the Southern Cone 
Common Market and Mercosur with the Andean Community (CAN). The 
subsequent meetings of CSN in 2005, the leaders of the CSN member countries 
established action plans to establish a common agenda (ibid). In 2007, in Margarita, 
Venezuela, when the first South American Energy Summit was held CSN changed 
its name to UNASUR (ibid; Chodor et al 2013:216). 
In 2008, the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR was launched, turning the 
organisation into a political body (ibid). UNASUR has in various occasions acted 
as a peace mediation organisation in contemporary Latin American conflicts. 
UNASUR was previously consulted for the mediation in the Honduran crisis in 
2009 (McCarthy-Jones 2014:59), and for the civic coup in Bolivia as well as the 
coup  d’état  in  Ecuador  in 2010 (Chodor et al. 2013:216; Arenas-Garcia 2013:74-
76).  The latest incident was the Venezuelan crisis in the spring of 2014 in which 
Venezuela appealed the issue to be raised in a special commission of Foreign 
ministers in UNASUR rather through OAS (PanAmPost 2014).  
                                                 
27 Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay rejected the proposal as it due the close 
association with the Washington Consensus principles and the IMFs structural adjustments reforms. 
28 Member states of UNASUR: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, 
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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A  Democratic  Protocol  was  put  forward  by  UNASUR’s  member  states  in  2010  
and has shown that it can bring leaders together of different political strands in the 
interest of the Latin American region at first hand (ibid:Arenas-Garcia). 
6.2.3 Community of Latin American and Caribbean States – CELAC 
Right after the first ALBA accords were signed between Cuba and Venezuela in 
December 2004, the 33-nation CELAC29 was created in 2011 in Caracas, affecting 
600 million people in Latin America (Anderson 2014:16). CELAC was a softened 
version of ALBA and accepted participation from states with different political-
economic systems (Anderson 2014:27). CELAC does not include United States or 
Canada among its member states. The Summit encouraged to discuss issues on 
deeper economic cooperation and regional trade, economic development and 
defence issues. CELAC represents the ten years of efforts to push forward the idea 
of deeper integration in the Americas, and is seen as an alternative to OAS (ibid).  
The latest Summit, held in Cuba, before that in Chile, was a conference that was 
dedicated to the issues of continuity and consensus instead of advocating for radical 
changes. As a Latin American integration project: “CELAC  is  still  just  a  mechanism  
for regular consultation between governments that lacks institutionalization and 
suffers from the low commitment of its members, particularly leading countries, to 
finance an integrative effort beyond bilateral trade and discretionary programs on 
education, health and other areas. There is no permanent secretariat and no 
economic and social integration beyond ad hoc  meetings”  (HuffingtonPost 2014). 
Thus, it is unclear what role CELAC will have in regional politics as it is a political 
institution still in its initial phase (McCarthy-Jones 2014:61).  
6.2.4 MERCOSUR 
MERCOSUR is a sub-regional trading bloc consisting of Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela and Bolivia30. The Member States shares common 
values of democratic and equal societies, human rights, environmental protection 
and sustainable development, security, poverty reduction, and economic 
development (MERCOSUR 2014). The organisation was established in 1991 by the 
Treaty of Asuncíon as an intergovernmental decision-making institution rather than 
a supranational body (Arenas-Garcia 2013:69). However, its origin is the 
Argentina-Brazil Integration and Economics Cooperation Program (PICE) 
(ibid:70). By the mid-2010s  it  expanded  and  became  “a  tool  for  progressists  to  resist  
                                                 
29 Member states of CELAC includes: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
30 It also associates Chile, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Guyana and Surinam, while New Zealand and 
Mexico has an observer status. 
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neo-liberalism and foster a[nd] socio-political agenda instead of promoting market 
goals”  (Arenas-Garcia 2012:73).  
In June 2006, Venezuela signed a membership agreement but it was not until 
July 2012 that it gained full membership into Mercosur. This was due and after that 
Paraguay had violated the Democratic Clause of Mercosur. Paraguay had objected 
to  Venezuela’s  inclusion  in  the  trading bloc and that created a crisis in the region 
(McCarthy-Jomes 2014:60-61).  
6.2.5 Petrocaribe 
Petrocaribe31 is an extension to ALBA and was launched in 2005, in Puerto la Cruz 
in Venezuela. It was established with the purpose to provide the Caribbean 
countries with reliable energy supply sources in such a way that the price of energy 
did not hinder development. Thus, Venezuela provides the petroleum to the 
Caribbean members and has in that way developed an alternative model of energy 
supply to the entire region (McCarthy-Jones 2014:56).  
It  is  PDVSA  that  provides  member  countries  the  oil  at:  “low  interest  rates  while  
they, in return would use their savings on oil and reinvest them in social and 
development projects akin to what the government in Caracas had been doing at a 
national  level”  (Acuña  2014:67,73). 
6.2.6 The Bank of the South - Banco del Sur 
The Bank of the South was established in September 2009 by Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela, and had an initial capital of 
$20 billion. The goal of the Bank of the South is to include all South American 
States. The Bank is a counter-reaction to the World Bank, IMF and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) and its WC-policies. McCarthy-Jones 
discusses  the  “humiliating  penalties”  and  “de-capitalization”  that  were  associated  
with the strict conditions of international loans during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
Bank has been meet with varying responses. In 2007, the Nobel Laureate 
(economist) Joseph Sitglitz welcomed the bank; stating that competition in markets 
is good, even in the development bank sector (McCarthy-Jones 2014:57-58). 
 
                                                 
31 Petrocaribe consists of Antigua and Barbyda, the Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaiaca, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, 
Suriname, and Venezuela (Acuña 2014:73). 
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 Analysis 
7.1 The Resource Curse of Venezuela 
The Dutch disease is another term that explains economies in which imports 
accounts for a large share and if the country devaluates its currency, the resulting 
tendency is an even higher inflation (Lander 2014:5). This is the case of Venezuela 
as a petro-state. The oil share increased from 68,7% in 1998 to 96% recently (ibid:2) 
and the inflation rate is currently estimated at 63,42% (Tradingeconomics). 
Petro-states are explained by the resource curse theory which concerns the 
harmful situation a country situates itself when producing a commodity which is 
subject to volatile prices and revenues which can lead to increased corruption in 
both the private as in the public sector and that neglect social investments. However, 
in much of the academic literature oil is generally emphasised as the main objective 
to all problems that Venezuela has in respect of political, economic, cultural and 
social issues; i.e it describes Venezuela as a petro-state encountering the resource-
curse problem subject to high inflation, lack of manufacturing and corruption in the 
country (Angosto-Ferrandez 2014:184).  
This is true but there is also more to complement. As it has been noted above, 
Venezuela has become an increasingly important actor in both domestic social 
development and in the development of Latin American integration and 
regionalism. This is confirmed by John Hammond in a study, which shows how a 
petro-state can overcome the resource curse by acting as a third world solidarity 
actor; for instance in Africa (Hammond 2011; Q13Fox).  
7.2 Post-Liberal  Regionalism  and  Venezuela’s  
Foreign Policy 
It has been observed by scholars that there has been a shift in the Latin American 
regional  integration  project  since  the  1990s  when  ‘open  regionalism’  was  supported  
by the WC-agenda and neoliberal policies and instead began to formulate its own 
intentions for political integration and a developmental agenda with the State at the 
centre instead of the Market (Chodor et al., 2013:211, 215).  
Nowadays,   one   can   speak   about   ‘post-liberal’   or   even   ‘post-hegemonic’  
regionalism   (ibid).   It   is   stated   that:   “the   new   post-liberal and post-hegemonic 
regionalism represents a renewed quest for regional autonomy, both from the global 
economy and the American hegemon, and its political and economic agenda for the 
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region”. This proves a return to an alternative vision of regional integration that 
dates back to Bolívar, as previously mentioned,  and  one  that  raises  the  “vision  of  
regional   order   based   on   notions   of   solidarity,   social   justice   and   cooperation”  
(Chodor et al. 2013:215). As mentioned above, autonomy was also requested by 
Chávez after his coup d´état experience in 2002.  
It is also suggested that: “integration  in  Latin  America  has  natural  advantages  
over   that   of   other   regions,   with   shared   culture,   history,   language,   and   identity”  
(ibid:212;Anderson 2014:24);;  this  is  in  accordance  with  Mansfield’s  and  Weiner’s  
explanation of the terms regionalism and integration. 
It is a new scenario for Latin American countries to have such an important role 
in shaping their own domestic and regional future as it has been possible during the 
21st Century, even though some countries are different in terms of political 
governance. Therefore, could the Bolivarian project with the 21st century socialism 
at its centre said to be: “counter-hegemonic, historically contingent, and social 
democratic – parallel to and sympathetic with the internal processes within 
Venezuela – yet in competition with Washington-led Pan-Americanism”  (Anderson  
2014:15). 
UNASUR, CELAC, Petrocaribe and ALBA are all regional cooperation 
initiatives influenced by Venezuela and have strengthened the autonomy in the 
region (Lander 2014:2). McCarthy-Jones emphasis that ALBA and Petrocaribe are 
early and radical attempts of Chávez to transform both the political and economic 
landscape of Latin America in the 21st century, after the FTAA-failure in the 1990s. 
Even though these projects are not entirely covering the region, they are still 
important for the vision of Latin American regionalism, integration and for the 
development agenda: ”through   a   process   of   incremental   institutionalization”  
(McCarthy-Jones 2014:54).  
Both ALBA and UNASUR were born in the frame of an extensive bottom-up 
critique of the neoliberal model. Despite their significant differences, these projects 
have put social, developmental and political issues back at the centre of the agenda, 
in the same way as Chávez did with the domestic political economy agenda. They 
are the reflection of a renewed way of thinking integration and development in 
South America (Arenas-García 2012:65, 70). With Mercosur, on the other hand, 
things are different since the goals, preferences and agendas are very diverse as to 
referring to economic regionalism and Venezuela has not been able to influence the 
agenda yet, more than the membership has enabled more trade opportunities with 
Brazil (Briceño-Ruiz 2014:14; The NYTimes 2007). 
However, as early as in 1999, Chávez emphasized the political aspects rather 
than the economical ones, when constructing the institutions for regional 
integration, which shows the ideological influence Chávez had with respect to 
Bolivarian Socialism (McCarthy-Jones 2014:56). Chávez went to the 2012 
elections with a program consisting of two central goals which was linked to 
international   politics:   “(1)   the   consolidation   of   Venezuela’s   role   within   the  
emerging  “great  Latin  America  and  Caribbean”  power”  and  (2)  “the  advancements 
of  a  “new  international  geopolitics”  of  multicentrism  and  pluripolarity”  (Angosto-
Ferrández 2014:3). The program remained after the elections as well; and relatively 
recently on the occasion of the EU-CELAC summit in Santiago, Chile, in January 
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2013;;  where  it  was  declared  that  Venezuelans  had  voted  for  Chávez  “dream  of  Latin  
American  people’s  unity”  (ibid).   
However, it is not abundantly to remind that many of the projects connected to, 
for instance ALBA, are dependent on a Chávez/Maduro-administration with 
devotion in petrol-related cooperation projects, which is the premise for the 
Venezuelan foreign policy. At the same time, does not many countries utilise their 
comparative advantages in their sectors and industries to establish bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation with other states? As mentioned, Venezuela is a petro-state 
that has overcome resource curse by acting as a third world solidarity actor. 
Venezuela is not only exporting oil but also Bolivarian Socialism abroad. 
It has been shown that, to analyse and explain the relation between the 
Bolivarian  revolution,  Venezuela’s  foreign  policy,  geopolitics  and  regionalism  is  a  
challenging assignment. However, it has also become more difficult to distinguish 
the borders between domestic and international politics since Chávez’ death. Even 
the Maduro-elections has been in focus of international media (Angosto-Ferrandez 
2014:I:3). 
At the same time, the domestic discontent and international media, is very 
different from the international so-called  “united   in  discontent”.  The  discontents  
represents a different group. The latter represents a group of individuals that are 
responding locally to globalization, which is different from the response from 
Venezuelan dissidents or the student movements, for instance. The latter is about 
dissatisfaction with international politics and how it addresses neoliberalism and its 
institutions and is often represented by the anti-globalisation movement. This is the 
common denominator which some other countries outside Latin America support, 
and in which at occasions is the premise for why Venezuela and these states 
cooperate and has established bilateral or multilateral relations. This is why the 
death of Chávez played a crucial role outside Venezuela and gave result in the 
reactions as they did (Angosto- Ferrandez 2014:II:185-186). Chávez, as a populist 
leader, had impacted on people beyond the Venezuelan and Latin American borders 
as he stood for a radical and alternative strategy for development and poverty 
alleviation, both internationally and domestically (ibid). 
Maduro is continuing, and maintains the legacy of Chávez, and is even 
deepening the meaning of the 21st century Socialism. Internationally, Maduro is 
struggling both with international media, the opposition and the massive public 
unrest. The recent Venezuelan crisis is also another incident in which regional 
organisations such as UNASUR instead of OAS, has been consulted for mediation, 
which show a power shift in Latin American regional insitutions. The Venezuelan 
Foreign Affairs minister even toured to six countries to present information 
regarding the issue and to gain their support. OAS’ position has been accused for 
being interventionist.  Thus, UNASUR   was   a   union   created   to   “counter   the  
imperialist   force   of   the   United   States”   and   the   Maduro-administration simply 
followed  Chávez’  legacy  and  rhetoric  on that occasion (PanAmPost; Chodor et al 
2013:216-217). This  reinforces  Maduro’s  position  in  the  regional  and  international  
arena; that domestic troubles does not weaken its international position and that 
Venezuela is still struggling against the U.S. hegemon, even though it is dependent 
on oil exports to the United States (USTR 2012; Foreign Policy 2014).  
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This study also gives further directions on the diverse political and economic 
regional organisations that currently co-exist in Latin America. Venezuela under 
Maduro’s  governance shows that Venezuela probably still is a foreign policy actor 
to count with in the political regional arena of Latin America, in the 21st Century. 
Oil will probably remain to be an internationally demanded commodity until 
alternative energy resources and markets appears in the future.  
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 Summary 
 
This case-study is about Venezuela and its petro-dependency which has been the 
oil exploitation industry since 1910. This oil wealth has throughout history 
influenced its relations with other countries in the Americas, United States and the 
rest of the world.  
The study examines Venezuela as a petro-state and its impacts on Latin 
American post-liberal regionalism and political integration by taking a closer look 
in the history in the Chávez- and Maduro Administration (1999-2014) which has 
been subject to a strong opposition. The study also gives further directions on the 
diverse political and economic regional organisations that currently co-exist in 
Latin   America.   Venezuela   under   Maduro’s   governance   shows   that   Venezuela  
probably still is a foreign policy actor to count with in the political regional arena 
of Latin America, in the 21st Century.  
The study also describes the various regional integration initiatives (OAS, 
ALBA-TCP, CELAC, MERCOSUR, PetroCaribe and the Bank of the South) which 
co-exist in contemporary Latin America and the Caribbean, in which some of them, 
Venezuela has had a greater impact on, and interest in developing because of the 
paradigm   shift   in   the   country’s   foreign   policy   agenda   and   rejection   of   the  
Washington Consensus Agenda. The study has both domestic and regional aspects 
of the Bolivarian Revolution since the 21st century Socialism is about expanding its 
ideas and ideology internationally as a counter-weight to neo-liberalism.  
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 Appendix  
 
10.1 Article  72  of  Venezuela’s  Constitution  1999 
 
[Appendix to page 23. Chapter 5.1.1 - Chávez Enters the Political Scene.] 
 
All magistrates and other offices filled by popular vote are subject to revocation. 
Once half of the term of office to which an official* has been elected has elapsed, a 
number of voters constituting at least 20% of the voters registered in the pertinent 
circumscription may extend a petition for the calling of a referendum to revoke such 
official's mandate. When a number of voters* equal to or greater than the number 
of those who elected the official* vote in favor of revocation, provided that a 
number of voters* equal to or greater than 25% of the total number of registered 
voters* have voted in the revocation election, the official's mandate shall be deemed 
revoked, and immediate action shall be taken to fill the permanent vacancy in 
accordance with the provided for in this Constitution and by law. The revocation 
of the mandate for the collegiate bodies shall be performed in accordance with the 
law. During the term to which the official* was elected, only one petition to recall 
may be filed.  
 
Source: Venezuela’s  Constitution  1999.  Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela (in English translation from the original legal text). National 
Constituent Assembly.  
http://www.venezuelaemb.or.kr/english/ConstitutionoftheBolivarianingles.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
